Limits To Certainty in QoS Pricing and Bandwidth

Advanced services require more reliable bandwidth than currently provided by the Internet Protocol, even with the reliability enhancements provided by TCP. More reliable bandwidth will be provided through QoS (quality of service), as currently discussed widely. Yet QoS has some implications beyond providing ubiquitous access to advance Internet service, which are of interest from a policy perspective. In particular, what are the implications for price of Internet services? Further, how will these changes impact demand and universal service for the Internet. This paper explores the relationship between certainty of bandwidth and certainty of price for Internet services over a statistically shared network and finds that these are mutually exclusive goals.Comment: 29th TPRC Conference, 200

An Atomicity-Generating Layer for Anonymous Currencies

Atomicity is a necessary element for reliable transactions (Financial Service Technology Consortium, 1995; Camp, Sirbu and Tygar, 1995; Tygar, 1996). Anonymity is also an issue of great importance not only to designers of commerce systems, (Chaum, 1982; Chaum, 1989; Chaum, Fiat & Naor, 1988; Medvinski, 1993), but also to those concerned with the societal effects of information technologies (Branscomb 1994. Compaine 1985, National Research Council 1996, Neumann 1993, Poole 1983). Yet there has been a tradeoff between these two elements in commerce system design. Reliable systems, which provide highly atomic transactions, offer limited anonymity (Visa, 1995; Sirbu and Tygar, 1995; Mastercard, 1995, Low, Maxemchuk and Paul, 1993) . Anonymous systems (Chaum, 1985; Chaum 1989; Medvinski, 1993) do not offer reliable transactions as shown in Yee, 1994; Camp, 1999; and Tygar, 1996. This work illustrates that any electronic token currency can be made reliable with the addition of this atomicity-generating layer.IB

Towards Coherent Regulation of Law Enforcement Surveillance in the Network Society

In this paper, we study the evolution of telecommunications technology and its impact on law enforcement surveillance. Privacy and the need for law enforcement to conduct investigations have not been at the center of the recent public policy debate. Yet, policy environments have approved law enforcement surveillance that can be and is intrusive. Law enforcement surveillance therefore deserves particular attention when discussing the basic human right to privacy. We illustrate that despite the gradual acceptance of the basic human right to privacy, in the digital age the United States (US) government continues its historical pattern of using technology to enhance its power of search . The most recent example is the installation of the Digital Collection System 1000 (DCS1000), formerly known as Carnivore, a classified packet sniffer, on American networks by the American federal law enforcement agency.NSF grant 9985433; HP equipment gran

Conceptualizing human resilience in the face of the global epidemiology of cyber attacks

Computer security is a complex global phenomenon where different populations interact, and the infection of one person creates risk for another. Given the dynamics and scope of cyber campaigns, studies of local resilience without reference to global populations are inadequate. In this paper we describe a set of minimal requirements for implementing a global epidemiological infrastructure to understand and respond to large-scale computer security outbreaks. We enumerate the relevant dimensions, the applicable measurement tools, and define a systematic approach to evaluate cyber security resilience. From the experience in conceptualizing and designing a cross-national coordinated phishing resilience evaluation we describe the cultural, logistic, and regulatory challenges to this proposed public health approach to global computer assault resilience. We conclude that mechanisms for systematic evaluations of global attacks and the resilience against those attacks exist. Coordinated global science is needed to address organised global ecrime

Criteria and Analysis for Human-Centered Browser Fingerprinting Countermeasures

Browser fingerprinting is a surveillance technique that uses browser and device attributes to track visitors across the web. Defeating fingerprinting requires blocking attribute information or spoofing attributes, which can result in loss of functionality. To address the challenge of escaping surveillance while obtaining functionality, we identify six design criteria for an ideal spoofing system. We present three fingerprint generation algorithms as well as a baseline algorithm that simply samples a dataset of fingerprints. For each algorithm, we identify trade-offs among the criteria: distinguishability from a non-spoofed fingerprint, uniqueness, size of the anonymity set, efficient generation, loss of web functionality, and whether or not the algorithm protects the confidentiality of the underlying dataset. We report on a series of experiments illustrating that the use of our partially-dependent algorithm for spoofing fingerprints will avoid detection by Machine Learning approaches to surveillance

When Proof of Work Works

Proof of work (POW) is a set of cryptographic mechanisms which increase the cost of initiating a connection. Currently recipients bear as much or more cost per connection as initiators. The design goal of POW is to reverse the economics of connection initiation on the Internet. In the case of spam, the first economic examination of POW argued that POW would not, in fact, work. This result was based on the difference in production cost between legitimate and criminal enterprises. We illustrate that the difference in production costs enabled by zombies does not remove the efficacy of POW when work requirements are weighted. We illustrate that POW will work with a reputation system modeled on the systems currently used by commercial anti-spam companies. We also discuss how the variation on POW changes the nature of corresponding proofs from token currency to a notational currency

MFA is A Necessary Chore!: Exploring User Mental Models of Multi-Factor Authentication Technologies

With technological advancements, traditional single-factor authentication methods, such as passwords, have become more vulnerable to cyber-threats. One potential solution, multi-factor authentication (MFA), enhances security with additional steps of verification. Yet, MFA has a slow adoption rate among users, and frequent data breaches continue to impact online and real-world services. Little research has investigated users\u27 understanding and usage of MFA while specifically focusing on the their mental models and social behaviors in a work setting. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 28 individuals (11 experts, 17 non-experts), while focusing on their risk perceptions, MFA usage, and understanding of required technologies. We identified that experts treated MFA as a useful added layer of authentication, while non-experts did not perceive any additional benefits of using MFA. Both non-experts and experts expressed frustration with MFA usage, often referring to it as a \u27chore.\u27 Based on these findings, we make several actionable recommendations for improving the adoption, acceptability, and usability of MFA tools